Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Egypt by Brent Hansen & Karim Nashashibi
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Egypt





Chapter Title: Chapter 1: Foreign Trade in the Egyptian Economy
Chapter Author: Brent Hansen, Karim Nashashibi
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c4050
Chapter pages in book: (p. 3 - 24)Chapter 1
ForeignTrade in the
Egyptian Economy
Thisstudy highlights foreign trade and exchange controls in Egypt and their
impact on economic development during the two decades between World War
II and the June 1967 War. The full picture, of course, emerges only in the
context of the country's overall economic policy, against the background of
its general economic conditions. At the same time, a detailed survey of the
Egyptian economy and its development is clearly beyond the scope of a special- -
izedstudy like ours; moreover, several general surveys are easily accessible
to the reader.' For these reasons we limit ourselves here to a brief sketch of
some major historical, economic, and political features important to foreign
trade and exchange policies.
NINETY YEARS OF FREE TRADE, 1840-1930
During the first decades of the nineteenth century, the viceroy Mohammed
All made an abortive attempt to develop Egypt into an autarchic industrial
economy.2 His policies collapsed around 1840, when agreements between the
European powers and the Sublime Porte—of which Egypt, in principle, was
a dependency—gave foreigners full freedom of trade and navigation in the
country and led to the abolition of government monopolies in trade and pro-
duction.3 Until 1930, Egypt continued under a regime of almost perfectly free
trade.4 The conventions signed by the Porte limited import duties to 5 percent
ad valorem, later increased to 8 percent, with a few exceptions varying over
time. At the end of the twenties the tariff for kerosene was 4 percent, for con-
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structiontimber, 10 percent, and for gasoline and lubricants, 15 percent. Ex-
cept for special, higher rates for alcohol and tobacco, the uniform 8 percent
ad valorem rate was applied to all other A general export duty was
first levied at 12 percent ad valorem, but soon lowered to 1 percent. Direct
controls were virtually nonexistent, with one important exception from 1916
on: a ban on imports of foreign cotton, which we shall discuss in detail later.
During close to a century of free trade the Egyptian cotton economy was
developed to a high level of perfection, but practically no industrialization
took place. The very substantial inflow of foreign capital and financial, com-
mercial, and technical expertise were absorbed in agriculture, trade, finance,
and infrastructure. With the wisdom of hindsight, it stands to reason that earlier
industrialization might have proved beneficial,6 and the British have been
strongly criticized for their free trade, nonindustrialization policy. In all fair-
ness it should be admitted, however, that generally few obstacles were raised
against industrialization,7 and that the development that actually did take place
was in the fields where the country obviously had a natural advantage. Also,
the British can hardly be blamed for failing to predict the Great Depression.
PROTECTIONISM AND THE BEGINNING
OF INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1930-1950
In 1930 Egypt gained tariff autonomy and immediately used her freedom
to reform the tariff system in a protectionist direction.8 Raw materials and
fuel were now taxed at lower rates than before; semimanufactured
at6 to 8 percent; and manufactured goods, at 15 to
30 percent. In most cases the duties were specific. During the 1930s they
were increased very substantially for manufactured goods such as textiles and
footwear. A general import tax of 1 percent ad valorem was introduced in
1932 and subsequently increased. The sugar industry was particularly favored
through a variable tariff that kept domestic prices at a high level independently
of fluctuations in the world market price of raw sugar. In addition to the tariff
reform, the government started supporting industries through subsidies, cheap
loans, and other measures.
Behind the tariff wall the few existing industries expanded and a number
of new ones were established during the 1930s. (For details, see Part Three.)
The low profitability of agricultural investments also helped to shift domestic
capital to manufacturing, and industrialization might have been initiated even
without the protectionist measures. With the relative fall in agricultural prices,
particularly for cotton, Egypt's natural advantages shifted somewhat in favor
of manufacturing industry.9 It has been held that the protectionist measures
helped greatly to establish domestic monopolies,'0 and this aspect of protec-FOREIGN TRADE IN THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMY 5
tionism may well have been equally important in the promotion of new
industries.
A further impetus to industrialization came with the outbreak of World
War II. When Italy entered the war, Egypt was largely cut off from foreign
supplies. The combined domestic civilian and Allied military demand led to
the emergence of new industries, partly in repair and metal manufacturing,
partly in areas based on hitherto ignored domestic raw materials.
The protectionist policies of the 1930s were continued after the war when,
for example, the production of nitrogenous fertilizers was taken up and the
textile industry expanded vigorously. The general ad valorem duty was raised
to 7 percent beginning with 1946, but was lowered again to 3 percent in 1950.
Duties on capital goods were lowered.
During the war an elaborate system of direct controls had been set up
by both Allied and national authorities for distributing food and scarce raw
materials and for regulating prices. This control system was never fully dis-
mantled after the war as commodity and foreign exchange shortages continued
to make themselves felt. During a brief spell of liberalization at the time of
the Korean boom it was substantially limited, but during the ensuing recession
direct controls once again gained in importance and subsequently became the
main instruments of Egyptian economic policy.
THE ECONOMIC POLICIES
OF THE NASSER REGIME
Using the plural form for the word policy in the title to this section is in-
tentional. The economic policy of the Nasser regime changed radically dur-
ing its first decade in response to external pressures and internal ideological
developments in a way that has never been satisfactorily explored.1'
The Organization of Free Officers that took power in 1952 was a
heterogeneous group of mainly young people with political views ranging from
the extreme left to the extreme right. It had no precisely formulated, detailed
economic program apart from the land reforms that were implemented almost
instantaneously. The latter had the character of political and social rather than
economic reforms, and were undertaken for reasons of social justice with a
view to redistributing wealth and income. Social justice was probably the
single economic idea that the members of the Organization of Free Officers
had in common and that clearly distinguished its policy from that of the old
regime. With all the imperfections of Egyptian economic policies, it remained
a leading principle of the government's political philosophy until recently.
In its general economic policy the new regime did little more than con-
tinue that of the old regime until the nationalization of the Suez Canal. The6 FOREIGNEXCI{ANGE REGIMES IN EGYPT, 1946—1969
FreeOfficers took power after the end of the Korean boom and the collapse
of the cotton markets, and fiscal and monetary as well as foreign exchange
policies were cautiously tight during the first year or two. In fact, the new
regime did not really take over general government until 1954, ahd in the
interim it was the old style politicians who ran economic policy. El Kaisouni,
who represented modem economic thinking in the Nasser regime, was ap-
pointed Minister of the Treasury in 1954; later he became, in addition, Mini-
ster of the Economy and Minister of Planning. Controls over foreign exchange
were tightened in 1953, but did not go beyond those found in both European
and underdeveloped countries at that time. Defense expenditures had been
substantially expanded by the old regime after the establishment of the Jewish
state in Palestine, but were not increased further (as a percentage of GNP)
by the new regime until the Yemen war in 1962. The old regime had em-
barked upon a public investment program that, by any standard, was quite
impressive. Little was done immediately to expand this program further. The
new regime relied basically upon private initiative in investment and pro-
duction, and sought to promote private investment by protectionism, tax in-
centives, and other conventional measures. Private enterprise was slow to
respond, however. Quite apart from the general recession in the Egyptian
economy from 1952 to 1954, both the land reforms and the new regime's
rather erratic sequestrations of private property served to create an atmosphere
of uncertainty that was not conducive to private investment activities and
tended to divert such activities to inconspicuous fields.
In the area of foreign trade and exchange, the major change—before the
events surrounding the Suez War in 1956 upset Egyptian trade completelj—
had already taken place back in 1947, when the old regime decided to leave
the Sterling Area and shift trade away from Britain. Bilateral trade was in-
itiated by the old regime but expanded rapidly during the first years of the
new regime, particularly with communist countries. In the beginning the ex-
pansion of trade with these countries had few ideological overtones: it was
merely another opportunity to expand the markets for Egyptian cotton and
textiles and thus expand trade in general. Nevertheless, it was trade with the
communist countries that, among other things, initiated the radical changes'
in economic policy that were soon to follow.
This is not the place to discuss the diplomatic and not-so-diplomatic
events that led up to and followed the Egyptian-Czechoslovak arms deal of
1955, the peculiar behavior of the United States in relation to the scheduled
Aswan High Dam loan from the World Bank, the nationalization of the Suez
Canal, the British-French-Israeli aggression and the Suez War, the accompany-
ing foreign exchange and trade blockade by the United States, Britain, and
France, and the subsequent shift of Egyptian trade from West to East.12 This
chain of events is of great interest in the present context, however, not onlyFOREIGN TRADE IN THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMY 7
because it changed Egyptian economic policy SO fundamentally but also be-
cause it poses some challenging problems for the conventional pure theory
of optimal trade. When a decision to make purchases (of weapons, in this
instance) in one half of the world creates trade and aid obstacles (and even
prompts war) from the other half, analysis ceteris paribus with respect to
conditions of trade becomes rather uninteresting initself. Ceteris paribus
analysis has, of course, still a role to play. The economic gain or loss from a
particular trade or exchange policy measure can be set against the gain or
loss from any retaliatory move; and ex post facto, the net gain or loss can
be calculated (assuming, of course, that the utility of all measures, including
the purchase of weapons, can be expressed in economic terms and is known) •13
Butfor designing future policies such analyses are of little operational value.
For here everything depends upon whether retaliation will take place and in
what form. An Egyptian decision to purchase more weapons from the Soviet
Union may be punished by the U.S. Congress through a ban on Egyptian
cotton exports to the United States; this would lead to a shift of Egyptian ex-
ports away from the United States to other countries, implying an extra cost
for the weapons deal. But the punishment might also take the form of stepped-
up military deliveries to Yemen royalists or to Israel, which, in turn, would
increase the shadow price of weapons in Egypt and act as an incentive for a
further expansion of weapons imports and commodity exports.
This kind of mechanism has played a major role in the development of
Egyptian foreign trade policies and patterns since 1956. In the nature of the
case, the pure theory of foreign trade has little advice to give about optimal
trade strategies under such circumstances.
At the outbreak of the Suez War, Egypt immediately confiscated all
property belonging to British and French subjects and nationalized all British
and French companies (concentrated mainly in banking, finance, and trade).
These steps were in a sense a natural and predictable consequence of the war.
What was less predictable is that the events were also followed by a change
in the attitude of the regime to domestic private business.
The war seems to have convinced the government that, if Egypt was to be
able to defend herself, economic development was imperative. The new regime
had, it is true, favored development in general terms all along and plans for
the Aswan High Dam were a cornerstone of Nasser's developmental think-
ing. But it was not until after the Suez War that the new regime seriously
embarked upon a development policy. Industrial and agricultural investment
plans were drawn up in 1957 with emphasis on public investment. The (pri-
vate) Federation of Industry was not even consulted on the plans and, when
disagreement arose about the direction of private investment, nationalization
of the big Misr Bank followed in 1960. A comprehensive five-year plan for
the first half of the 1960s assumed that virtually all investment should beS FOREIGNEXCHANGE REGIMES IN EGYPT, 1946—1969
public.In July 1961 a series of decrees suddenly nationalized all large-scale
industry, finance, and trade.14 Further nationalization decrees, together with
an extension of the land reforms, followed in1963, and a national charter
declared Arab socialism to be the basis of the economic system and the
economic policy of the country. It should be added that sequestrations (based
on presidential decrees) continued erratically (from an economic point of
view, at least) to bring private property under public administration.15
All these changes added up to the establishment of a new economic system
in Egypt. It is not clear, however, what the logic of this new system was.
Behind the sweeping changes there was no carefully elaborated, coherent
economic and social philosophy. The ideologists of the regime largely limited
themselves to ex post comments on whatever decisions had actually been made,
and such comment seldom went beyond simplistic rhetoric. Nasser's own
speeches—long though they were—were not very illuminating, either. It is
not always clear whether changes in the system were ends in themselves, under-
taken to satisfy certain ideological requirements, or whether they were used
as means, necessary to fulfill the basic aims of the regime: social justice, with
its implications for distribution of wealth, income, and opportunity (includ-
ing employment), economic growth, and (at least from the time of the Yemen
war) what can be called military grandeur.'6 Nor should expediency, as well
as the erratic responses of a highly impulsive and often badly informed ruler
to short-term problems,'7 be ruled out as explanations.'8
THE NEW ECONOMIC SYSTEM
The following pages outline the major characteristics of the present economic
system as it was created at the beginning of the sixties and briefly indicate
some major implications for the targets of the regime and for the foreign
trade and exchange problems analyzed in detail later in our study.
The present system derives its socialist character mainly from the fact
that all big business is in the hands of the government, which has taken over
existing businesses and founded new ones. Since little, if any, compensation
has been paid for existing enterprises taken over by the government, the
change in ownership of big business has been accompanied by the disappear-
ance of the upper tail of the wealth and income distribution. The land re-
form has worked in the same direction, although it has not directly expanded
government ownership of the means of production; with the exception of the
royal family, compensation should have been paid to the old owners accord-
ing to the law, but as a matter of fact nobody has ever received compensation.19
There is no legal limit to the size of private enterprises, and such enter-
prises can be established in principle in almost any field. However, the govern-
ment would presumably not let any private business grow big without na-FOREIGN TRADE IN THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMY 9
tionalizing it sooner or later, and, of course, this presumption exerts a strong
brake on private initiative. It would probably be difficult, if not impossible,
to find private enterprises today with more than one hundred employees; the
vast majority have a few employees at most. Strangely enough, in urban real
estate it is still possible to find big private capitalists. While the regime is not
hostile in principle to small-scale private business, it has explicitly favored
the idea of cooperative organization as the desirable form of private small-
scale enterprise. However, apart from a network of government retail stores
named "cooperatives," little has been achieved in the direction of cooperative
operations outside agriculture.
Government versus private economic activity by sector is divided as
follows: modern manufacturing, mining, electricity and other public utilities,
construction, transport and communication, finance, and wholesale trade (in-
cluding almost all foreign trade) are, by and large, government-owned, while
most retail trade, handicrafts and repair, housing, professional services of all
kinds, and agriculture are privately owned operated. Furthermore, the
government imposes some control even upon agricultural production through
its control over the irrigation system and the compulsory participation of all
cultivators in the government-sponsored agricultural cooperatives. About half
of the gross domestic product is produced by the public sector.
Government controls may also be classified by expenditure categories.
Private consumption is largely free in the sense that only a few necessities are
rationed, and even those may usually be purchased without controls at higher
prices. However, the consumer is, of course, limited in his choice by the avail-
able supplies, which, to a large extent, depend directly upon government
decisions in production and trade. Consumer credits were given generously
until around 1964—65 for purchases of domestically produced consumer dur-
ables,.but have been difficult to obtain since then. Public consumption is deter-
mined through traditional budgetary procedures, with large-scale weapons
purchases negotiated directly by the president. Investments are public up to
90 percent. Decisions about public investments are taken by the ministries
within limits set by the government. When a ministry has decided upon an
investment within its allocation it will generally give a green light to financing
and importation of investment goods. Some large public investments, partly
financed from abroad, are decided upon directly by the government in negotia-
tions with foreign donors or lenders. No general criteria for public investments
seem to have been laid down. Private investment activities are very limited
and in most cases conditioned by building or import licenses. Private fixed
investment consists mainly inresidential building. Exports and imports,
finally, are almost exclusively a public activity.
The government exercises wide control over the distribution of capital
goods, raw materials, and semimanufactures as well as over prices and wages.
Historically, most of these controls have had nothing to do with the public10 FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGIMES IN EGYPT, 1946—1969
ownership of larger enterprises. Both import licensing and price controls (in-
cluding agricultural support price schemes and the like) grew up during the
forties and the fifties, and enterprises have remained subject to such controls
even after nationalization. In this regard the present Egyptian economic system
resembles the Western European control economies of the late forties more
than the current communist economies (including Yugoslavia's). Now the
controls seem to have become part and parcel of Arab socialism, but they
were originally introduced in Egypt for much the same reasons as earlier in
Western Europe: if everything had been left to market forces, shortages of
foreign exchange and commodities would have led to strong shifts in relative
prices and income distribution, incompatible with prevailing views on social
justice. There is a difference, however—whereas Western Europe rapidly over-
came the shortages and was able to abolish commodity and price controls as
well as foreign exchange controls in the first half of the fifties, Egypt has be-
come more and more deeply entangled in her own web of controls. A de-
cisive factor here is certainly that the administrative feasibility of solutions
to problems of social justice through taxes and transfers is much more limited
in Egypt than in Western Europe, regardless of the fact that the Nasser regime's
commitment to social justice targets may have been no less sincere than that
of most Northwestern European governments.
It has already been emphasized that both public and private enterprises
are, in principle, constrained by administrative controls. This circumstance
does not mean, of course, that public and private enterprises are, in fact,
treated equally by the controlling authorities, or that they respond to changing
conditions in the same way. Price controls are most effective with respect to
public enterprises, which, on the other hand, are clearly favored in the dis-
tribution of scarce capital goods, spare parts, and raw materials. Apart from
public utilities, public enterprises are in most cases organized as joint-stock
companies, with the government as the sole or major shareholder. Decisions
on current management, in theory at least, are left to the board of directors
and the general manager. Thus, public enterprises in both production and
trade could, if so ordered, behave like profit-maximizing private enterprises
(given the constraints of administrative price and commodity controls). How-
ever, no general directives seem to have been issued for their management;
as a matter of fact, there is considerable direct interference with production
decisions from the ministries under whose jurisdiction the enterprises operate.
There is also some participation in management by the workers, but its main
impact seems to have been to create difficulties in enforcing discipline on
the shop floor. It is thus exceedingly difficult to generalize about the behavior
and responses of public enterprises. One thing is abundantly clear—they do
not behave just like profit-maximizing private enterprises.
From this description of the system it is evident that—disregarding black
markets—there is relatively little direct, automatic price response to changesFOREIGN TRADE IN THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMY 11
in demand and supply conditions. Some agricultural goods enjoy free price
formation, and the same is true of most products and services in the area
of handicrafts, repair shops, professionals, and so forth. But all major com-
modity prices are fixed by the government, which also sets wholesale and
retail profit margins. Even factor prices are widely controlled. Rentals (but
not prices) of agricultural land and urban buildings, as well as interest on
loans from all financial institutions, are fixed at low levels. Wages in public
enterprises are paid according to a scale set by the government. Statutory
minimum wages for both urban and rural workers exist but are enforced only
for larger enterprises and public works, and not at all in agriculture. Trade
unions are government-controlled and have little impact on wages.
Moreover, with some 40 percent of domestic expenditures for final use,
as well as imports and exports, administratively controlled by the government,
and about half of the production of goods and services for final use taking
place in the public sector—together with some direct government interference
in private production—it follows that automatic responses of quantities in de-
mand and supply are, by and large, limited to private consumption and small-
scale production (partly including agriculture, to be sure). Thus, market
forces have been largely replaced by administrative decisions, although all this
does not amount to a centralized command economy of the communist type
but resembles, rather, (as already mentioned) the controlled economies of
Western Europe during the years immediately following World War II.
Insofar as the 1960s are concerned, it is therefore obvious that we cannot
apply uncritically the standard competitive foreign trade models to Egypt and
assume that balance of payments measures will have the standard effects upon
the balance of payments and the domestic economy. The same is partly true
for the second half of the 1950s. With foreign trade and payments entirely
in the hands of the government, there is no such thing as an automatic balance
of payments response. Effects on the domestic economy through price re-
sponses will make themselves felt mainly to the degree that the government
deliberately chooses to change domestic prices; indeed, to a large extent, both
domestic prices and quantities supplied must simply be considered as policy
instruments. In such an economy a devaluation, to take an important example,
will only work to the extent that the government takes complementary mea-
sures in regard to prices and quantities—measures which could be taken with-
out a formal devaluation.
NATIONAL PRODUCTION AND EXPENDITURES,
1947 TO 1969_7020
To highlight the structure of the Egyptian economy and its development

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































r14 FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGIMES IN EGYPT, 1946—1969
GDP—by origin and expenditure categories in years that demarcate the be-
ginning or end of periods particularly interesting from an economic policy
point of view.
The 1947—1952 period was one of rapid postwar recovery at a growth
rate of about 5 percent per annum. It ended with the Korean boom and is
the only period marked by attempts to liberalize foreign trade and payments.
Since then the tendency has been, instead, toward more direct control over
the foreign sector.
During the period from 1952 to 1955 there was a relative slack in the
economy, with only a growth of about 2 percent. These were the years when
the new regime was still quite passive with regard to development and overly
conservative in the area of fiscal and monetary policy, considering the very
substantial gold and foreign exchange reserves.
After the Suez War of 1956 the government's development efforts in-
creasingly dominated the economy, and both fiscal and monetary policies
became inflationary. This period lasted until about 1964, when foreign ex-
change difficulties forced the government to cut back investments and generally
pursue a less expansionary fiscal and monetary policy. The fiscal year 1963—
64 marked the end of unhampered development efforts. The average growth
rate for this period was almost 6 percent.
The following three years were characterized by severe foreign exchange
shortages, relatively tight fiscal and monetary policies, and,it should be
added, poor crops. The growth rate slowed down to an average of little more
than 3 percent. With the June 1967 War, GDP fell, and, despite a subsequent
recovery, the growth rate averaged only about 1½ percent during the thi'ee
years ended June 1969.
Population may have been growing by somewhat less than 2 percent
annually at the end of the forties. By 1960 the rate had increased to about
2.4 percent and by 1970 to 2.5 percent. The period 1947—1952 may thus
have experienced an annual increase of per capita income of about 3 percent.
From 1952 to 1955—56 per capita income probably fell slightly. During the
development years, from 1956—57 to 1963—64, there was an annual increase
of 3—3 ½ percent. Thereafter, per capita income first stagnated and then fell
somewhat. From 1968—69 to 1971—72 it may have been increasing again by
some 3—3 ¼ percent, but is now nearly stagnant.
The composition of national expenditure closely reflects the policies be-
hind the development of the growth rate. During the nearly ten years between
1947 and 1956—57 the share of gross (fixed) investment remained low at a
level of 12 to 13 percent. The share of public consumption increased by about
8 percentage points (partly for defense) over the period, while that of private
consumption seems to have dropped sharply—by about 10 percentage points.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.FOREIGN TRADE IN THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMY 15
From 1956—57 to 1963—64 the share of fixed investments increased by
6 percentage points to about 19 percent. The share of public consumption
increased by another 6 percentage points to 21 percent. These increases were
offset (in real terms) by a continued steep decline in the share of private con-
sumption of almost 8 percentage points and an increase in the foreign deficit
of 4 percentage points.
The cutbacks in demand initiated in 1964 to curb inflation and improve
the balance of payments did not affect the share of private consumption very
much. The share of public consumption fell moderately, and that of invest-
ments, substantially. The June 1967 War further intensified the fall in the
share of investments, while public consumption took a new strong jump to
almost 25 percent of GDP and the foreign deficit temporarily increased. Pri-
vate consumption kept its share almost unchanged despite the war.
Egypt thus ended the sixties devoting almost as low a share of GDP to
investments as it had in 1947. But public consumption had more than tripled
(to almost 25 percent), while that of private consumption had shrunk by one
fourth (to about 65 percent). A largely unchanged payments deficit persisted.
Table 1—2 also brings out a decline in foreign trade relative to GDP.
From 1952 to 1969—70 total exports of goods and services fell from 21.4 to
14.3 percent of GDP. Part of this fall is related to the closure of the Suez
Canal. Canal revenues amounted to about 4 percent of GDP in 1966—67.
Total payments for imports of goods and services (including payments for
military equipment but excluding interest and dividend payments) remained
at the very high level of about one quarter of GDP until 1963—64, after which
the ratio was cut back to about 18 percent. (The balance of payments will be
discussed in somewhat more detail in the following section.)
FOREIGN TRADE AND BALANCE
OF PAYMENTS, 1947-1969
The Egyptian balance of payments has been persistently in the red since
World War II (see Table 1—3). The cumulated current deficit from 1950
through 1967 amounted to £E993 million. It should be noted that deficits
existed already before 1950, and that the cumulative figure does not include
possible credits for military equipment outstanding at the end of 1967.
The deficits were financed mainly by first drawing on the large foreign
exchange reserves accumulated during World War II to a total of £E364
million and then by loans to an amount of £E595 million (net). The re-
serves (net) of gold and foreign exchange were brought down to a minimum
at the beginning of the 1960s (see Table 3—7), when the foreign debt began































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































-18 FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGIMES IN EGYPT, 1946—1969
480 counterpart funds equal to £E131 million at the end of 1966) played
an important role, but otherwise the loans have come mainly from communist
countries. It was the abrogation of PL 480 in 1965 in combination with the
exhaustion of foreign exchange reserves that brought the country's develop-
inent efforts to a virtual halt already before the outbreak of war in June 1967.
The balance on commodity trade had shown substantial payments deficits
during the 1950s, fluctuating between £E12 and £E70 million, and in-
creased to a range of £E150 to £E170 million in the 1960s. Disregarding
the Korean boom years of 1950—51, export performance has been rather poor
throughout the postwar period. Even when measured from the recession years
1953 and 1954, and adjusting for a depreciation of the Egyptian pound by
almost 25 percent in 1962, the value of exports rose by less than 50 percent
up to 1967, or by 3 percent annually. The average rate of increase in the
U.S. dollar value of world trade during the same period was, of course, much
higher. Calculated in the same way, imports rose by almost 100 percent, or
about 5½ percent annually, which is a modest increase, too, if compared to
world trade.
Another way of presenting the trends in foreign trade is to measure ex-
ports and imports as percentages of GNP. This is done in Chart 1—1. From
1953, when the share of exports was about the same as before World War
11—15 to 16 percent of GNP—we see a clear downward trend, perhaps flat-
tening at the end, to a level of 12 percent in 1969. Imports first show a down-
ward trend from 22 to 23 percent of GNP in 195 1—52 to about 17 percent
in 1961. This is followed by a strong upturn, with imports remaining at a very
high level until 1968. In the years that followed imports were cut so
tically that in 1969 a trade surplus emerged for the first time since World
War II.
During the 1940s the trade deficit ran at a level of 1 percent of GNP,
about the same as before the war. After the Korean boom it increased to a
level of some 4 to 5 percent of GNP, where it remained until the beginning
of the 1960s, when it increased further to some 6 to 10 percent of GNP
until 1966.
A substantial part of the widening in the trade gap was covered by an
increase in the Egyptian revenues from the Suez Canal. Considering the effects
of the nationalization of the Canal, Egypt's2' net foreign revenue from the
Canal increased from about LE1O million in 1953 to £E95 million in
1966, or by about £E85 million. The trade payments deficit rose during the
same period by about £El30 million. Increasing government expenditure
abroad (mainly for military equipment),22 however, added another £E25
million to the deficit's growth.
Thus, in the last year before the war of June 1967, the deficit on mer-
chandise trade was £E15 1million. Of this £E95 million was covered bySuez Canal revenue, while other invisibles (net) contributed another £E13
milion, which together would have meant a current deficit of £E43 million.
Government expenditure, however, increased the deficit to £ E76 million, of
which £E64 million was covered by longer-term loans (net) and the re-
mainder by further drains on the reserves.
The composition of both exports and imports has changed substantially
over time. Before World War II Egypt was largely a one-product exporter,
raw cotton constituting about 9/10 of total exports, while imports consisted
mainly of manufactured consumer goods, fuel, and some raw materials. On
the export side (Table 1—4), the picture was still much the same in 1950, raw
cotton accounting for 85 percent of total exports. During the next two decades
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CHART 1-1
Exports and Imports as Percentages of GNP, 1938—39 to 1969—70
Percent of GNP
1938'40 '45 '50 '55 '60 '65 '6920 FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGIMES IN EGYPT, 1946—1969
TABLE 1-4






Value in Millions of Egyptian Pounds
1950 149.8 7.6 2.3 4.0 11.7 175.4
1955 107.4 7,3 4.5 7.4 11.7 138.3
1960 134.7 9.8 9.5 18.9 18.7 191.6
1965 146.2 19.8 12.4 47.0 37.6 263.1
1968 121.1 44.9 11.5 52.4 40.4 270.3
1970 147,8 34.2 29.0 53.7 66.5 331.2
1950 85.4
Percentage Distribution
4.3 1.3 2.3 6.7 100.0
1955 77.7 5.3 3.2 5.4 8.4 100.0
1960 70.3 5.1 5.0 9.9 9.7 100.0
1965 55.6 7.5 4.7 17.9 14.3 100.0
1968 44.8 16.6 4.3 19.4 14.9 100.0
1970 44.7 10.3 8.8 16.2 20.1 100.0
SOURCE: Economic Bulletin, National Bank of Egypt, 1970.
its share fell to 45 percent, while that of cotton textiles (yarn and cloth) in-
creased from 2 to 16 percent. In value terms the increase in cotton textile
exports much more than compensated for the fall in raw cotton exports but,
of course, the major part of the processed cotton served to satisfy the increas-
ing domestic demand and entirely wiped out cotton textile imports. Rice
bzcame the third largest single export item, growing from 4 percent of total
export value in 1950 to 17 percent in 1968, but falling again to 10 percent
in 1970. Miscellaneous exports increased their share from 7 to 20 percent
during the twenty-year period. These include small exports of a substantial
number of manufactured goods (oil and fuel, cement, and footwear, in par-
ticular). Counting cotton textiles as two goods (yarn and cloth), as well as
fruits and vegetables, Egypt thus developed from a one-commodity exporter
in 1950 to a six-commodity exporter in the second half of the sixties.
On the import side (Table 1—5), the share of capital goods imports in-
creased sharply from 1950 to 1955, subsequently remained almost constant
at a level of 24 percent until 1968, and increased once more to 31 percent in
1970. The growth in the share of capital goods imports during 1950—1955
was largely compensated for by a decline in food imports, which, however,
showed a strong and steady relative uptrend thereafter, reaching 32 percent
in 1968. 'This increase was, in turn, compensated for by an almost equal fallFOREIGN TRADE IN THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMY 21
TABLE 1-5




Goods Materials Goods Total
1950 50.2
Value in Millions of Egyptian Pounds
48.4 88.1 31.8 218.5
1955 25.0 37.4 78.8 45.2 186.4
1960 47.9 32.6 88.7 55.8 225.1
1965 110.2 45.3 155.0 95.4 405.9
1968 91.9 28.9 99.3 70.5 290.6
1970 72.6 32.4 129.5 107.5
Percentage Distribution
342.0
1950 23.0 22.2 40.3 14.6 100.0
1955 13.4 20.1 42.3 24.3 100.0
1960 21.3 14.5 39.4 24.8 100.0
1965 27.1 11.2 38.2 23.5 100.0
1968 31.6 9.9 34.2 24.3 100.0
1970 21.2 9.5 37.8 31.4 100.0
Nom: Economic "aid" is not included. ("Aid" here probably means grants; thus,
PL 480 aid, a loan, is included.) Military equipment is not included.
SOURCE: Economic Bulletin, National Bank of Egypt, 1970.
in the shares of other consumer goods and raw materials. This represents, to
some extent, import substitution (cotton textiles, footwear, and fuel, for ex-
ample), but for the rest became possible only through domestic commodity
shortages (manufactured goods consumed by the middle and upper income
brackets, materials used in handicrafts, and so forth). More recently the share
of food imports shrank again, to 21 percent in 1970, as a result of the increase
in agricultural
Finally, Table 1—6showsthe development of trade with the communist
countries ("Eastern Europe"). In 1950 such trade was insignificant, but in
1955—the year of the Czechoslovakian arms deal—exports increased sub-
stantially, with imports unchanged. This export surplus remained character-
istic of the trade with communist countries throughout the following period.
It has obviously served to cover payments for military equipment not included
in the import figures: note that the surplus is of the same order of magnitude
as the item "government expenditure" in the balance of payments (Table
1—3). By 1965 imports from these countries were about one quarter of total
imports, while exports to them were about half of the total. In 1970, after the
1967 War, imports from the East Bloc reached one third of total imports,22 FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGIMES IN EGYPT, 1946—1969
TABLE 1-6




% of % of Eastern
Year Mill. LETotal Mill. LETotal Europe Total
1950 13.9 6.4 18.8 10.7 +4.9 —41.4
1955 13.1 7.0 30.1 20.6 +17.0 —41.2
1960 55.8 24.0 83.0 41.9 +27.2 —34.7
1965 92.0 22.7 129.1 49.5 +37.1 —142.6
1968 116.9 40.4 132.1 48.9 +15.2 —19.3
1970 114.8 33.5 201.3 60.7 +86.5 —10.9
SouRcE: Economic Bulletin, National Bank of Egypt, 1970. For coverage, see Note
to Table 1—5.
while exports to that area increased to above 60 percent of the total, with a
trade surplus of no less than £E86.5 million, obviously related to greatly
increased payments for military equipment.
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Development of Egypt, London, 1935. See also the articles in C. Issawi, The Economic
History of the Middle East, 1800—1914, Chicago, 1966, Part VI; Z. Y. Hershiag,
Introduction to the Modern Economic History of the Middle East, Leiden, 1964; and
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process of change.
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secretiveness with which they are surrounded and because no world market exists with
market prices for heavy weapons, but also because they are part of public consumption
and thus give rise to the problems in modern welfare theory related to the existence of
public goods.
14. Nutting, in "The Socialist State," op. cit., Chapter 15, gives a very different
account of these events, in particular the relations to the Misr concern. However, he got
the chronology of events wrong. His main point—that Nasser should have suspected the
Misr group of a conspiracy to destroy the union with Syria and that the nationalizations
were a punishment for this conspiracy—makes littlesense. The breach with Syria
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nationalized after the breach (see pp. 295—300). It is quite another thing that a wave of
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15. A reversal of the sequestrations was promised by President Sadat,' but it is not
clear how much property has actually been returned to its old owners.
16. Maxime Rodinson, in israeland the Arabs, NewYork, 1968, suggests that
grandeurwas,in fact, Nasser's main concern from the very beginning, and that his
economic development policies have to be seen as a means to this end. But most observers
agree that his concern with social justice and improvement of the standard of living of
the broad masses was genuine and always pervaded his thinking (see, for instance, Anwar
Abdel Malek, Egypt: Military Society, New York, 1968; and, particularly, Anthony
Nutting in his 1972 book cited in footnote 11).
17. Thus, it has been maintained that the nationalizations in 1963 were largely
undertaken to create retirement positions for officers dissatisfied with the Yemen War.
18. For a more general discussion of the motivations for the changes in the system,
see the somewhat diverging views in O'Brien (see footnote 11), and Hansen (see foot-
note 1), pp. 72—78. But these are views of economists and may not be very relevant for
the political issues. Nutting, who probably knew Nasser personally better than anybody
else, gives the impression that the whole thing for Nasser was a power game. To "protect
the revolution," powerful private capitalists could not be allowed to exist, and this was
something that apparently Nasser should havefeltright from the beginning. The
nationalizations thus became the instrument for the ultimate consolidation of both the
revolution and Nasser's personal power. (See Nutting, op. cit., Chapters 3 and 15.)
19. This is a fine point that has escaped most authors who write about the conse-
quences of the Egyptian land reforms.
20. Throughout this volume the notation 1963—64 refers to fiscal year July 1to24 FOREIGNEXCHANGE REGIMES IN EGYPT, 1946—1969
June30, unless otherwise indicated. As of 1960, Egyptian statistics are increasingly
presented on a fiscal year basis. This is, uniortunately, an inconvenience that we can do
nothing about. The reader should note that in some connections the agricultural year
(November—October) or the cotton year (September—August) is used.
21. The major part of the Canal dues before nationalization accrued to the foreign-
owned Canal Company.
22. Military equipment has been obtained from the communist countries as grants,
against cash payment, and with loans. The total and its distribution among these three
classes are not known. Only payments (at delivery or deferred) appear in the balance of
payments, and they are classified as current payments, lumped together with expenditure
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government payments.
23. For the first time since World War II, in 1970 Egypt was again a net food
exporter by £E26 million.